One stovepiping is "piping" of raw intelligence data directly to decision makers, bypassing established procedures for review by professional intelligence analysts for validity (a process known as vetting), an important concern since the information may have been presented by a dishonest source with ulterior motives, or may be invalid for a myriad of other reasons. For example, numerous articles and books have subsequently appeared to detail how conflicts between the Bush administration and the intelligence community marred the reporting on Iraq’s weapons.
The Office of Special Plans (OSP), created by the George W. Bush administration, is credited with stovepiping raw intelligence related to Saddam Hussein's government in Iraq to high-level Bush administration officials. Media analysis and professional analysts from other US government departments subsequently determined that many of the reports originated with dishonest sources or were untrue for other reasons (see Curveball), and the process of vetting would have prevented their reaching decision makers through normal channels. As one report stated, "The 2003 Iraq prewar intelligence failure was not simply a case of the U.S. intelligence community providing flawed data to policy-makers. It also involved subversion of the competitive intelligence analysis process, where unofficial intelligence boutiques 'stovepiped' misleading intelligence assessments directly to policy-makers and undercut intelligence community input that ran counter to the White House's preconceived preventive war of choice against Iraq." The stovepiping by the OSP had the effect of providing a substantial portion of the untrue allegations that formed the publicly declared justifications for the 2003 Invasion of Iraq, such as allegations of collaboration with Al Qaeda and an ongoing program of weapons of mass destruction.